"blunder" because the Allies used his memoirs, which criticized the imperial government for having frustrated the efforts at peace, as evidence that Germany had caused the war of its own free will.7 After World War II, Fritz Fischer and his pupil, Imanuel Geiss, continued the tradition of treating the exchanges of August 1 as Lichnowsky's misunderstanding.8 More recently, Harry Young has written that on August 1, Grey attempted to formulate an arret militaire between France, Germany, and Russia, but that Lichnowsky failed to include Russia in the calculations.9
Luigi Albertini provided probably the most noted rejection of the "misunderstanding thesis." In his Le origini della guerra del 1914, he argued that a dull-minded Grey blundered into proposing the abandonment of Russia through Anglo-French neutrality.?1 Edward Corp portrayed Grey in an even worse light. While agreeing with Albertini that no misunderstanding occurred, Corp argued that Tyrrell persuaded Grey to allow him to offer English neutrality to Lichnowsky because he did not want England to aid Russia; in other words, a private secretary had convinced the British foreign secretary to offer Germany proposals which, in Corp's words, "made political and strategic nonsense." 11 Thus, the historiography of August 1, 1914, could be reduced to a debate between those who say Lichnowsky was deaf and those who argue Grey was feebleminded.
A more satisfying interpretation can be found by assuming that Grey knew what he was doing and that Lichnowsky's hearing was normal. Hermann Lutz hinted at this alternative in his largely overlooked Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg. In this work, he concluded that there was no "misunderstanding" on August 1 and that the episode "was a stage in the struggle between Grey's followers and the majority of the Cabinet and an attempt, born of necessity, to keep France out of the war in the event of the interventionists failing to carry the day."12 Lutz, unfortunately, failed to explain himself further. Nevertheless, Grey's cabinet problems influenced his diplomacy significantly. The Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges should be viewed as a part of his effort to ameliorate the effects of a war he feared England would not enter. Furthermore, Grey so detested war that even after he was satisfied the cabinet would permit intervention, he attempted to pressure France into taking steps that would prevent the war. Grey's attempts to mediate between the powers in the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28 have been ably treated elsewhere.13 Suffice it to say that Grey only brought the matter to the attention of the cabinet on July 23, after his peaceful overtures fell on deaf ears and the crisis deepened with Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. At the meeting of Monday, July 27, he received no clear mandate for action from his colleagues. Finding himself thus constrained, Grey deftly turned necessity into virtue and over the next few days stressed England's "free hand" in an attempt to strengthen pacific councils in Berlin and Paris.
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia reached the Foreign Office the evening of July 28. The next afternoon, Grey again pressed the cabinet for a declaration of support for France, but that body adjourned without taking a stand. The cabinet had "decided not to decide" as John Burns recorded in his diary.'4 Grey, therefore, used England's uncertain position to best advantage by telling the French and the Germans exactly what they did not want to hear. After discussing the European situation with Lichnowsky that afternoon, Grey warned him that he should not be misled by their cordial conversation into believing that England could stand aloof, should France and Germany enter the conflict. In his dispatch to Sir Edward Goschen, his ambassador in Berlin, Grey wrote that he had told Lichnowsky, "If Germany became involved in it [war], and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation-which I hoped would continue-into thinking that we should stand aside." 15 Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression we would stand aside." When told Britain "cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war," Cambon begged Grey to reconsider. Grey replied that the cabinet would reconsider the situation in the event of new developments but could give no pledge at that moment.25
Word of Russia's general mobilization reached London at approximately five o'clock on July 31.26 At midnight, the German embassy sent a note to the Foreign Office that concluded that the Russian action "affected Germany, whose mediation had been solicited by the Tsar personally. We were compelled, unless we wished to abandon the safety of the Fatherland, to answer this action, which could only be regarded as hostile, with serious counter-measures. We could not idly watch Russia mobilizing on our frontier. We therefore told Russia that At that moment, Austria and Serbia were at war, Russia's partial mobilization had become general, and Germany threatened its own mobilization, which meant war unless Russia cancelled its mobilization. Those endorsing the "misunderstanding thesis" rest their case on the dubious assumption that Grey was asking Germany to stand aside and watch Russia crush Berlin's Austro-Hungarian ally. The Kaiser could not be expected to take such a proposal seriously. On these grounds alone, let alone on those to be discussed below, it is evident that Grey actually proposed Anglo-French neutrality in a RussoGerman war to Lichnowsky. At that moment, Austria and Serbia were at war, Russia's partial mobilization had become general, and Germany threatened its own mobilization, which meant war unless Russia cancelled its mobilization. Those endorsing the "misunderstanding thesis" rest their case on the dubious assumption that Grey was asking Germany to stand aside and watch Russia crush Berlin's Austro-Hungarian ally. The Kaiser could not be expected to take such a proposal seriously. On these grounds alone, let alone on those to be discussed below, it is evident that Grey actually proposed Anglo-French neutrality in a RussoGerman war to Lichnowsky.
Grey before he presented it to the cabinet. Just prior to the cabinet meeting, Grey telephoned the German ambassador to ask "whether I [Lichnowsky] thought I could give an assurance that in the event of France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and Germany we should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at today's Cabinet meeting." 36 Though sent in one telegram at 11:14 A.M., Lichnowsky's dispatch mentioned two different communications with Grey: Tyrrell's mission and Grey's phone call. Significantly, in this second exchange, Lichnowsky made explicit reference to French neutrality during a Russo-German war, which obviously contradicts the "misunderstanding" thesis. When reduced to its essentials, this narrative indicates that Grey, in return for guaranteeing French neutrality, received an assurance that Germany would not attack France in a Russo-German war. In other words, Grey suggested that France and England would stand aside and view the defeat of Serbia and Russia. Albertini commented that the kaiser, the chancellor, and their advisors at the Schloss were so blinded with elation that they "never stopped to ask themselves whether they were dreaming or whether Grey had gone crazy." It may be regarded as certain that on the morning of 1 August Grey really believed in the possibility of promising Germany that France and England would remain neutral. The idea was in every sense absurd. It was inconceivable that France would betray her ally and leave her at the mercy of Austria and Germany, while it was easy to foresee that, once victory in the east had been gained, Germany would turn her strength against France.... Once France had been beaten the same fate would sooner or later have overtaken Britain. It seems impossible that Grey can ever have entertained such an idea. And yet he did so.37
In these comments, however, Albertini failed to consider Grey's position vis-a-vis the cabinet. When Grey sent Tyrrell on his errand and when he called Lichnowsky just before 11:00 A.M., he had to assume that the cabinet would not sanction intervention. Given this scenario, Grey would be forced to inform Paris that England definitely would not intervene in a Balkan quarrel. Salvaging something from the situation, he could, at least, offer the French Lichnowsky's guarantee that Germany would not attack if France remained neutral. Paris, no doubt ringing with cries of "Perfide Albion," would then face two disbefore he presented it to the cabinet. Just prior to the cabinet meeting, Grey telephoned the German ambassador to ask "whether I [Lichnowsky] thought I could give an assurance that in the event of France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and Germany we should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at today's Cabinet meeting." 36 Though sent in one telegram at 11:14 A.M., Lichnowsky's dispatch mentioned two different communications with Grey: Tyrrell's mission and Grey's phone call. Significantly, in this second exchange, Lichnowsky made explicit reference to French neutrality during a Russo-German war, which obviously contradicts the "misunderstanding" thesis. When reduced to its essentials, this narrative indicates that Grey, in return for guaranteeing French neutrality, received an assurance that Germany would not attack France in a Russo-German war. In other words, Grey suggested that France and England would stand aside and view the defeat of Serbia and Russia. Albertini commented that the kaiser, the chancellor, and their advisors at the Schloss were so blinded with elation that they "never stopped to ask themselves whether they were dreaming or whether Grey had gone crazy." It may be regarded as certain that on the morning of 1 August Grey really believed in the possibility of promising Germany that France and England would remain neutral. The idea was in every sense absurd. It was inconceivable that France would betray her ally and leave her at the mercy of Austria and Germany, while it was easy to foresee that, once victory in the east had been gained, Germany would turn her strength against France.... Once France had been beaten the same fate would sooner or later have overtaken Britain. It seems impossible that Grey can ever have entertained such an idea. And yet he did so.37
In these comments, however, Albertini failed to consider Grey's position vis-a-vis the cabinet. When Grey sent Tyrrell on his errand and when he called Lichnowsky just before 11:00 A.M., he had to assume that the cabinet would not sanction intervention. Given this scenario, Grey would be forced to inform Paris that England definitely would not intervene in a Balkan quarrel. Salvaging something from the situation, he could, at least, offer the French Lichnowsky's guarantee that Germany would not attack if France remained neutral. Paris, no doubt ringing with cries of "Perfide Albion," would then face two dis- With Lichnowsky's word in his pocket, Grey faced the cabinet. During the meeting, Winston Churchill was denied permission to mobilize the navy. The cabinet also decided that it still could not propose that Parliament send an expeditionary force to the continent.38 But Grey, faced with the apparent realization of his worst fears of enforced neutrality, did not choose to make use of Lichnowsky's pledge, nor, for that matter, did he reveal that he had even talked with the German ambassador that morning. Why not?
Belgium provides the only plausible answer. The cabinet did give Grey permission to tell Lichnowsky that, "if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."39 Though Grey that evening said that he would have to have a "tussle" with the cabinet the next day, one must conclude that he believed this statement to be a decisive step toward intervention in the impending war. It is otherwise difficult to account for Grey's failure to mention Lichnowsky's pledge to his colleagues.
However, Grey saw quite well that there yet remained a chance that his plan for intervention would not work. The cabinet adjourned at around 1:30 P.M. At 2:10 P.M., Lichnowsky cabled Berlin that "Sir William Tyrrell has just been to see me and told me that Sir Edward Grey wants this afternoon to make proposals for England's neutrality, even in the event of our being at war with France as well as Russia. With Lichnowsky's word in his pocket, Grey faced the cabinet. During the meeting, Winston Churchill was denied permission to mobilize the navy. The cabinet also decided that it still could not propose that Parliament send an expeditionary force to the continent.38 But Grey, faced with the apparent realization of his worst fears of enforced neutrality, did not choose to make use of Lichnowsky's pledge, nor, for that matter, did he reveal that he had even talked with the German ambassador that morning. Why not?
However, Grey saw quite well that there yet remained a chance that his plan for intervention would not work. He [Grey] had been wondering whether it would not be possible for us and France in the event of a Russian war to remain facing each other without either side attacking. I asked him whether he was in a position to give me an assurance that France would agree to a pact of that sort. Since we intended neither to destroy France nor to annex parts of her territory, I could imagine that we might enter on an agreement of that sort since it would assure us of Great Britain's neutrality. The minister said that he would enquire, but was not blind to the difficulties of restraining two armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity.45
Grey thus not only backed away from his earliest offer of French passivity but revealed that he had made it without having consulted the French. His answer also sheds light on another aspect of the alleged "misunderstanding" of August 1. Lichnowsky here specifically asked about the possibility of French neutrality during a Russo-German war, in exact accord with his telegram of 11:14 A.M., and Grey's only reply was a weak intimation that it might prove impossible to restrain two mobilized armies while Germany attacked Russia; thus when offered a perfect opportunity to tell Lichnowsky that he had misunderstood the conditions under which he had earlier proposed Anglo-French neutrality, Grey did not do so. No misunderstanding had occurred.
At the 3:30 P.M. meeting, Lichnowsky of course did not receive the proposals for England's neutrality during a German war with the Franco-Russian Alliance that Tyrrell had suggested in his second trip to the German Embassy. Rather, Grey made a statement of conditions under which the British might intervene. The violation of Belgian neutrality of course headed the list. The German ambassador remained calm in spite of this discouraging turn of events. He asked whether Grey could give a definite assurance of British neutrality if Germany agreed to respect Belgium's borders. Young wrote that "this clever cabinet had moved toward a commitment to Belgium, and the Belgians had indicated that they would defend themselves against a German invasion. Grey could now anticipate British participation in a European war.
Grey could not have looked forward to his 3:30 P.M. meeting with Lichnowsky. He had, of course, made no firm offer to Germany, yet he did face the ticklish task of dismantling his own initiatives. In a summation to Berlin of the day's exchanges as well as of his 3:30 meeting with Grey, Lichnowsky telegraphed Berlin: He [Grey] had been wondering whether it would not be possible for us and France in the event of a Russian war to remain facing each other without either side attacking. I asked him whether he was in a position to give me an assurance that France would agree to a pact of that sort. Since we intended neither to destroy France nor to annex parts of her territory, I could imagine that we might enter on an agreement of that sort since it would assure us of Great Britain's neutrality. The minister said that he would enquire, but was not blind to the difficulties of restraining two armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity.45
At In his first dispatch to Bertie after his talk with Lichnowsky, Grey continued to apply pressure: "I have definitely refused all overtures to give Germany any promise of neutrality, and shall not entertain any such suggestions unless it were on conditions that secured real advantages for France."58 "German Ambassador here seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it [emphasis added], that after mobilization on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive."59 Grey summarized for Bertie the gist of his 11:14 A.M. exchange with Lichnowsky. However, this was disingenuous because he had just told Lichnowsky that FrancoGerman passivity would not work because of "the difficulties of restraining the two armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity."60 But here Grey implied to Bertie that military passivity in the West could be advantageous to France. This was surely not the sort of statement those in Paris, counting on British support, wanted to hear.
Grey's handwritten draft of this telegram also contains clues to what happened on August 1 that are not available to those relying on the text provided in British Documents on the Origins of the War. Grey at first began his draft with the word "I," which was stricken out and for which was substituted the word "We."61 The records of the Paris embassy reveal that this correction was made in the official telegram sent to Bertie.62 While this is only a minor point, Grey's original wording, which was accidentally used in British Documents (cited hereafter 57 Ekstein and Steiner, in Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 405. 58 In the Paris embassy copy of this telegram, the word is "secured," not "seemed," as is recorded in BD 11. See PRO, FO 146/4411. In Grey's original draft, it is unclear whether he wrote "seemed" or "secured." See PRO, FO 371/2160. I have used "secured" because it was used in the embassy copy and makes more sense grammatically. Grey's draft contains yet another, much more important, piece of evidence. Historians have previously noted the significance of Grey's admission, "when I suggested it," with respect to the prospect of Franco-German neutrality and used it against proponents of the "misunderstanding thesis." In Grey's draft the words, "when I suggested it," were inserted into the original text.64 Thus, this statement was not unconsciously or mistakenly put into the dispatch; Grey wrote the note, realized that, as written, it appeared that the proposal for FrancoGerman passivity was Lichnowsky's, and added the words "when I suggested it" to correct this impression.
At 8:20 P.M., Grey telegraphed to Bertie an account of his afternoon interview with Cambon. He now presented the scenario portrayed in the previous telegram much more forcefully:
After the Cabinet to-day, I told M. Cambon that the present position differed entirely from that created by the Morocco incidents. In the latter, Germany made upon France demands that France could not grant, and in connection with which we had undertaken special obligations towards France. In these, public opinion would have justified the British Government in supporting France to the utmost of their ability. Now, the position was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany [emphasis added]. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.65 Bluntly stated, Britain could offer to spare France an invasion, and if Paris could not accept the offer because of the alliance with Russia,
